

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA**

**BECKLEY DIVISION**

**JEFFREY SCOTT CAMPBELL,**

**Petitioner,**

**v.**

**DAVID A. BERKEBILE, Warden,**

**Respondent.**

)  
)  
)  
)  
)  
)  
)  
)  
)  
)  
)

**Civil Action No. 5:10-0692**

**PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION**

On April 29, 2010, Petitioner, acting *pro se*, filed an Application Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State or Federal Custody.<sup>1</sup> (Document No. 1.) Petitioner alleges that the he “has been denied a Fifth Amendment liberty interest due solely to the refusal of Respondent, and those FCP-Beckley staff members under his control, to do their jobs or to comply with the mandates of the Second Chance Act and the Bureau of Prison’s own policy.” (*Id.*, p. 2.) Petitioner contends that “BOP policy and the law requires the preparation for release to the halfway house to be commenced 17 - 19 months prior to the release date, per Memorandums of April 14, 2008, and November 14, 2008.” (*Id.*) Petitioner states that “FPC Beckley staff failed to follow its dictates in Plaintiff’s case, or ever in his experience at FCP-Beckley, where this rule is universally ignored by staff, on information and belief, as union policy.” (*Id.*) Petitioner contends that “[h]ad Bureau of Prison’s policy and requirements been followed by Respondent, Plaintiff would now be at a halfway house with opportunities for gainful employment, greatly expanded liberty, and quite

---

<sup>1</sup> Because Petitioner is acting *pro se*, the documents which he has filed are held to a less stringent standard than if they were prepared by a lawyer and therefore construed liberally. *See Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).

possibly, complete release to his home by the halfway house, which is now full due to the incredible, institutionalized delaying tactics and failure of the performance of duty by Respondent.” (Id.) Petitioner, therefore, requests that he be released “to home confinement as allowed under the Second Chance Act and current BOP policy.” (Id., p. 4.)

### ANALYSIS

The undersigned finds that Petitioner’s Section 2241 Application must be dismissed as moot. Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that federal Courts may adjudicate only live cases or controversies. See Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 1253, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990); Nakell v. Attorney General of North Carolina, 15 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 866, 115 S.Ct. 184, 130 L.Ed.2d 118 (1994). This means that the “litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. In the context of a *habeas corpus* proceeding, the writ “does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 494-95, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 1129, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973). In this case, by virtue of Petitioner’s release from custody, the Respondent can no longer provide the requested relief. Consequently, the Court can no longer consider Petitioner’s Application under Section 2241.

An incarcerated convict’s (or a parolee’s) challenge to the validity of his conviction always satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement, because the incarceration (or the restriction imposed by the terms of the parole) constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and redressable by invalidation of the conviction. Once the convict’s sentence has expired, however, some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole - - some “collateral consequence” of the conviction – must exist if the suit is to be maintained.

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct. 978, 983, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998). Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims are rendered moot by virtue of his release from custody and the absence of

collateral consequences,<sup>2</sup> and therefore, his Section 2241 Application must be dismissed. See e.g., Alston v. Adams, 178 Fed.Appx. 295, 2006 WL 1194751 (C.A.4 (Va.)); Alvarez v. Conley, 145 Fed.Appx. 428, 2005 WL 2500659 (C.A.4 (W.Va.)); Smithhart v. Gutierrez, 2007 WL 2897942 (N.D.W.Va.).

### **PROPOSAL AND RECOMMENDATION**

Based upon the foregoing, it is therefore respectfully **PROPOSED** that the District Court confirm and accept the foregoing factual findings and legal conclusions and **RECOMMENDED** that the District Court **DISMISS** Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(Document No. 1.) and **REMOVE** this matter from the Court's docket.

Petitioner is notified that this Proposed Findings and Recommendation is hereby **FILED**, and a copy will be submitted to the Honorable United States District Judge Irene C. Berger. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B), Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing Proceedings in the United States District Courts Under Section 2255 of Title 28, United States Code, and Rule 45(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Petitioner shall have seventeen days (fourteen days, filing of objections and three days, mailing/service) from the date of filing of these Findings and Recommendation within which to file with the Clerk of this Court, written objections, identifying the portions of the Findings and Recommendation to which objection is made, and the basis of such objection. Extension of this time period may be granted for good cause shown.


---

<sup>2</sup> The Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Locator indicates that Petitioner was released from custody on September 3, 2010.

Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver of *de novo* review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S. Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1208, 104 S. Ct. 2395, 81 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1984). Copies of such objections shall be served on opposing parties, District Judge Berger, and this Magistrate Judge.

The Clerk is requested to send a copy of this Proposed Findings and Recommendation to Petitioner, who is acting *pro se*.

Date: July 23, 2013.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
R. Clarke VanDervort  
United States Magistrate Judge